

# The UNICEF/Community Action for Social Development Experience

Learning from Rural Development  
Programmes in Cambodia

Working Paper 9

Teng You Ky, Pon Dorina,  
So Sovannarith & John McAndrew



Working  
Paper  
No. 9

CAMBODIA DEVELOPMENT RESOURCE INSTITUTE  
IN COLLABORATION WITH THE MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT  
WITH FUNDING FROM THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND



# **The UNICEF/Community Action for Social Development Experience**

**Learning from Rural Development  
Programmes in Cambodia**

**Working Paper 9**

**Teng You Ky, Pon Dorina, So Sovannarith & John McAndrew**



**Cambodia Development Resource Institute  
in collaboration with the Ministry of Rural Development  
with funding from the United Nations Children's Fund  
Phnom Penh, March 1999**

**Copyright © 1999 UNICEF / Cambodia Development Resource Institute**

*All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the written permission of UNICEF. The Cambodia Development Resource Institute retains and reserves all rights relating to the design and layout of this impression.*

**The UNICEF/Community Action for Social Development Experience  
Learning from Rural Development Programmes in Cambodia—Working Paper 9  
March 1999**

Teng You Ky, Pon Dorina, So Sovannarith & John McAndrew

**Cambodia Development Resource Institute  
56 Street 315, Tuol Kork, Phnom Penh (Postal address: PO Box 622, Phnom Penh, Cambodia)  
Tel: (855-23) 880-734 / 368-053 / 366-094 Tel/Fax: (855-23) 426-103  
e-mail: [cdri@camnet.com.kh](mailto:cdri@camnet.com.kh) / [cdri@forum.org.kh](mailto:cdri@forum.org.kh) <http://www.cdri.org.kh>**

# Contents

Abstract.....	i
Glossary .....	iii
<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1. Distribution of Benefits.....</b>	<b>2</b>
Impact of Infrastructure Projects on Economic Well-Being and Standard of Living.....	3
Impact of Loan Activities on Economic Well-Being and Standard of Living.....	3
Impact of Agricultural Extension Projects on Economic Well-Being and Standard of Living.....	4
Strategies for Reaching the Poorest .....	5
<b>2. Participation, Decision-Making and Ownership.....</b>	<b>5</b>
Participatory Rural Appraisal, Participation and Decision-Making .....	6
Village Development Committees, Participation and Decision-Making .....	6
Ownership and Dependency .....	7
<b>3. Sustainability .....</b>	<b>8</b>
The Funding of Rural Development .....	8
Organisational Plans for the Sustainability of their Programmes .....	9
Sustainability of Infrastructure .....	10
Sustainability of Credit Activities.....	10
<b>4. Organisational Structure and Approach .....</b>	<b>11</b>
Engaging the Local Community .....	11
Relief and Development Approaches .....	11
Local Planning Processes.....	11
Output and Process Approaches .....	12
Monitoring and Evaluation .....	12
<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>13</b>
Appendix One—UNICEF/CASD.....	15

*Appendix One is a summary of the case study for the UNICEF/Community Action for Social Development programme. The full case study (which runs to 40 pages) is available from the Cambodia Development Resource Institute.*



---

## **Abstract**

This working paper situates the findings of the UNICEF/CASD case study in the context of CDRI Working Paper No. 4, which is a comparative analysis of the joint Cambodia Development Resource Institute/Ministry of Rural Development research project entitled Learning from Rural Development Programmes in Cambodia. The analysis of that Working Paper, and of this one, is structured around four questions: 1) How are benefits distributed? 2) How much has the community assumed ownership of the programme? 3) How can the programme be sustained? 4) How has the organisational structure and approach of the development organisation affected implementation? The UNICEF/CASD experience broadens the contribution of, and compares favourably to, the six development organisations studied previously, and thus makes for a worthy complement to the original project.





---

## Glossary

---

### Acronyms

CARERE	Cambodia Area Rehabilitation and Regeneration
CASD	Community Action for Social Development
CRC	Cambodian Red Cross
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
LRDP	Learning from Rural Development Programmes
NGO	non-governmental organisation
PRA	participatory rural appraisal
PDRD	Provincial Department of Rural Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VDC	village development committee
WFP	World Food Programme

### Place Names

Battambang province	ខេត្តបាត់ដំបង
Kandal province	ខេត្តកណ្តាល
Kompong Thom province	ខេត្តកំពង់ធំ
Kratie province	ខេត្តក្រចេះ
Siem Reap province	ខេត្តសៀមរាប
Svay Rieng province	ខេត្តស្វាយរៀង
Takeo province	ខេត្តតាកែវ
Battambang district	ស្រុកបាត់ដំបង
Romeas Hek district	ស្រុករមាសហែក
Ampil commune	ឃុំអំពិល
Tamuen commune	ឃុំតាន្ទីន
Tras commune	ឃុំត្រស់

Krasang village

ភូមិក្រសាំង

Popel village

ភូមិពពេល

---

# The UNICEF/Community Action for Social Development Experience

---

## Introduction

Rural development programmes initiated by bilateral, multilateral and NGOs have proliferated in Cambodia as a consequence of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords. While aid agencies routinely monitor and evaluate their own programmes, the development community as a whole has done little to generate lessons learned from their collective experience. The Ministry of Rural Development and the Cambodia Development Resource Institute therefore undertook a joint project entitled Learning from Rural Development Programmes (LRDP). The aims of the project were:

- To generate lessons from a comparative analysis of selected rural development programmes in order to inform policy-making in the Ministry of Rural Development;
- To build the analytical capacities of LRDP team members;
- To facilitate and contribute to inter-agency debate on rural development in Cambodia.

Much discussion about development tends to be influenced by the need to compete for scarce donor funding. This leads to a degree of positive reporting which severely distorts reality and gives an exaggerated impression of what development organisations have achieved and might be expected to achieve. In this context, the commitment to open, frank examination of issues relating to rural development demonstrated by the leadership of the partner programmes, which volunteered their participation in the LRDP project, deserves full recognition. It is hoped that the cooperative endeavours of the LRDP team and the project partners in the village-focused studies will enable debate which is well grounded in reality.

The research method began with the local community's own perceptions of change, and the importance it attached to various aspects of the development process. While the LRDP case studies began with the experiences of local communities, they considered more than this alone. Because a key objective of the research was to find out what was working or was not working, and why, the approach placed major emphasis on assessing and synthesising the judgements of different actors—beneficiaries, the project sponsors, non-beneficiaries, and other local people—about the project's performance and impact. The research team also tried to weigh the merits of judgements which differed. The intent was to draw conclusions that were clear and generally accepted by knowledgeable groups, rather than to demonstrate strict measures of objectivity.

Providing useful answers to questions of change that have taken place within the lives of various programme participants, as compared to those of non-participants, entailed more than simply gathering and reporting data. It involved a process whereby the research team jointly

collected and analysed information and decided where to go next to develop the understandings that were emerging from the particular village experience. In each of the LRDP case studies, the consequences of development activities in two village communities were investigated and compared.

Each partner was invited to select two villages where they felt their development programme was proceeding well. The research team spent five days in each village, conducting interviews with village authorities, village development committees (VDCs) and other villagers (both those who were participating in the development activities and those who were not). The team spent a further five days in each province conducting interviews with partner programme staff and examining available documentation. At the conclusion of each village study, preliminary findings were discussed with the VDC members. At the conclusion of the case study, initial findings were presented to programme staff in the province and the provincial department of rural development. Further comments were solicited from the management of the partners.

Analysis and reporting has been structured around four key questions:

- 1) How are programme benefits distributed?
- 2) To what extent has the local community assumed ownership of the programme?
- 3) In what ways might the programme be sustained?
- 4) How has the organisational structure and community approach of the organisation affected implementation?

These issues are closely inter-related, but in order to maintain clarity they were treated separately in the case studies. The original research consisted of six case studies which were undertaken between September 1997 and January 1998. The six participating organisations were: Oxfam/Chumraen Chiet Khmer (Takeo), Krom Akphiwat Phum (Battambang), UNDP CAREERE/SEILA (Siem Reap), Hun Sen Krangyov Development Centre (Kandal), GTZ/Provincial Development Programme (Kompong Thom) and Partners for Development (Kratie). In June 1998, the Cambodia Development Resource Institute published Working Paper No. 4, which presented a comparative analysis of the lessons learned from the six case studies.

In June 1998, a follow-up case study was undertaken by the Cambodia Development Resource Institute and the Ministry of Rural Development of the UNICEF/Community Action for Social Development (CASD) programme using the same method and framework as the original six case studies. The UNICEF/CASD study was carried out in two villages: Popel village in Tras commune, Romeas Hek district, Svay Rieng province, and Krasang village, Tamuen commune, Battambang district, Battambang province (see Appendix One for the executive summary of the UNICEF/CASD case study). This Working Paper situates the findings of the research within the comparative analysis of the six organisations studied earlier. As such, it follows the same structure as CDRI Working Paper No. 4.

## **1. Distribution of Benefits**

The distribution of programme benefits was a key area of investigation in both the original LRDP research and the UNICEF/CASD study. This section assesses the impact of various project activities on the economic well-being and standard of living of village residents.

*Impact of infrastructure projects on economic well-being and standard of living*

Infrastructure projects introduced by CASD in the two study areas have consisted of wells, roads, latrines, and a health centre. The most immediate benefits have been produced by the wells. Before construction of the wells, villagers in these communities relied on either hand-dug wells or community ponds. The wells have provided clean water for drinking and cooking and for personal hygiene. Given the prevalence of drought in both villages, the wells have supplied water in difficult periods when other sources have dried up. This has considerably reduced the threat of disease.

The health centre that serves Popel has provided many women from the village with the means to practise birth spacing. In Popel, village roads constructed as food-for-work activities in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) have provided better access to markets and to the health centre. In this drought-stricken community, the milled rice received and promised from the road improvements comprise an important material benefit.

In Krasang, the benefits derived from the building of latrines for family use have yet to be demonstrated. It was unclear whether the installation of a limited number of latrines in the village would contribute significantly to the improved health of the entire community, or even to that of the families who had built them.

Of all the infrastructure projects initiated by the development agencies in the original study, the construction of irrigation canals had done the most to transform the economic livelihoods of village communities. Roads also had produced economic gains when they resulted in better access to markets. The construction of wells, health centres and schools had provided more social benefits for the long term. The impact of infrastructure activities under CASD has been similar. Although CASD infrastructure projects (which notably did not include the construction of large irrigation canals) had not transformed local economies, the building of wells, roads and a health centre contributed to the well-being of villagers.

*Impact of loan activities on economic well-being and standard of living*

Much as in the earlier programmes studied, loan activities have emerged as an important component for CASD to achieve its objective of improving the living conditions of women and children. In Popel, a rice bank established under the programme will begin to make loans of rice to members in September 1998. The rice bank follows from a successful one-cycle fertiliser lending scheme in the village and from a failed one-cycle rice seed borrowing activity. In Krasang, a fertiliser credit project has been converted into a cash credit activity, and there are plans to do the same with the current pig credit project. In Krasang, credit has also been provided for the construction of latrines. In both villages, loan activities have benefited mostly medium to better-off households with access to land and capital.

Before assessing the effectiveness of CASD loan activities in improving the well-being of women and children, it might be helpful to consider first the findings of the earlier study. In general, rice banks and credit schemes were found to be more important to villagers as subsidies to subsistence, rather than as means of transforming livelihoods. In the case of rice banks, the amount of rice that members were able to accumulate and borrow were not of sufficient quantity to reduce perennial periods of deficit or to offset seasons of low crop yields. Maintaining rice banks in areas where low rice yields were endemic had been extremely difficult. The original study therefore questioned the appropriateness of establishing rice banks in communities where rice production was low and unpredictable.

In the case of the credit schemes studied earlier, loans were not of sufficient volume to bring about major increases in productivity. The loans were likewise not provided as part of a clear and coherent strategy for raising incomes in the local economy. To the extent that credit schemes were able to make loans available at lower interest rates than those of local money-lenders, the funds took the edge off indebtedness and provided a real service to beneficiaries,

primarily medium to better-off families. Nevertheless, participants in credit schemes still borrowed from traders and moneylenders, despite the high interest rates, particularly when they needed money for medical expenses or to finance temporary migrant work overseas. The study argued that income generating projects needed to be identified before loans were provided, and amounts sufficient for the projects' requirements then needed to be allocated.

With respect to the rice bank in Popel, the observations of the original study appear ominous. Prolonged drought in the village severely diminished rice yields in 1996 and 1997, and in 1998 there was no rice harvest at all. If this pattern continues, it is extremely unlikely that rice bank members in this first year of lending will be able to repay the principal and interest on their paddy rice loans at the 1999 harvest. Anticipating this possibility, the VDC chief indicated that, in the case of a poor harvest, borrowers would not be required to repay their loans until the following season. When asked what would happen in the event of a successive poor season, she acknowledged that this had yet to be considered, but suggested that it would probably result in the bankruptcy of the rice bank. In this case, the benefit of the rice bank would consist of a one-cycle distribution of rice that would accrue to less than half of the families in the village, mainly the medium to better-off, which comprised its membership.

With regard to the credit activities in Krasang, the earlier findings were likewise applicable. For example, the fertiliser credit scheme helped to support rice cultivation, but it did not produce major changes in rice productivity. Most of the participants in the scheme already used fertiliser or hired tractors for land preparation. Some even participated in the fertiliser credit scheme of another development agency to meet all their needs. Similarly, the pig credit scheme had the potential to augment household incomes, but it did not expect to transform village livelihoods. Although both the fertiliser and pig credit schemes represented well-defined, though limited, strategies for raising incomes, the conversion of these projects into cash credit activities rendered them amorphous. Given the limitations of the funds and the inherent difficulty of monitoring money, cash credit would be extended at pre-determined amounts and used for generic purposes. The commodity-turned-cash credit schemes did not therefore represent a clear and coherent strategy for raising incomes in the local economy.

By its very nature, the provision of latrine credit in Krasang constitutes an investment in fixed assets that does not produce immediate capital returns. For that reason, many villagers, particularly the poor, are reluctant to take advantage of this type of credit, even when it is interest-free. It certainly can be argued that good health provides economic benefits, for it allows villagers to remain in the labour force and to avoid expensive medical treatment. The link between the use of latrines and the reduction of disease has to be demonstrated more tangibly, however, before latrine credit can be counted as a major contribution to the economic well-being of villagers.

#### *Impact of agricultural extension projects on economic well-being and standard of living*

The provision of food security in the CASD study villages focuses on projects to increase rice, vegetable and livestock production. In Popel, CASD has provided villagers with fertiliser loans, rice seed loans and vegetable seeds. In Krasang, CASD has supplied villagers with fertiliser loans, vegetable seeds and pig credit. In both villages, the promotion of vegetable growing was linked to the provision of wells. Indeed, the construction of treadle or agricultural wells in Popel was specifically intended to provide water for the irrigation of small plots. The strategy of enhancing family food production through well construction and home garden promotion has been used effectively by UNICEF in previous programmes. In Popel, and Krasang, the impact of the approach has not been fully realised for lack of follow-up in agricultural extension. In Popel, for example, construction of the treadle wells was not accompanied by instruction in how to plot the land for proper irrigation. In both villages, vegetable seeds were distributed without follow-up visits to home gardens or opportunities for farmers to learn from each other.

In its plan of operations, CASD acknowledges that increased yields in rice production require improvements in irrigation supply in addition to those in fertiliser application and agricultural practices. In the study villages, CASD interventions directed at increased paddy rice production have been limited to the provision of fertiliser and rice seed. In Popel and Krasang, chemical fertiliser was distributed to villagers without imparting sufficient knowledge about its proper use. In Popel, rice seeds were loaned to villagers without due consideration for the very real threat of drought. The lack of attention to agricultural extension practice thus diminished or undermined the potential benefit of the inputs provided. Similarly, the pig credit project in Krasang was weakened by the provision of hybrid pigs which were not suited to the conditions of the village.

To its credit, CASD has linked the construction of wells to the provision of vegetable seeds and the promotion of home gardens. But much like the previous programmes studied, the gains of building infrastructure and distributing agricultural inputs have been diminished because of the lack of follow-up in agricultural extension. Like the other programmes reviewed, more in-depth consultation and training with villagers was needed, with the emphasis on mutual learning among farmers themselves.

### *Strategies for reaching the poorest*

In the original LRDP studies, three main strategies for reaching the poorest were identified. Of the three strategies, the least effective was that of assisting the entire community and hoping for benefits to trickle down. A second strategy of working in remote and impoverished areas was more effective, particularly when combined with infrastructure projects that provided direct benefits to the poorest, such as the construction of wells. A third strategy of designing projects specifically for the poorest was effective when participation was strictly limited to this group. The LRDP study concluded that greater attention needed to be given to the development of special projects for the poorest, with a view towards increasing the proportion of resources devoted to such activities.

In Svay Rieng, the CASD choice of Romeas Hek district clearly embodied a strategy to work in a remote and impoverished area. Prolonged drought in the district have caused severe rice shortages for most families. In Popel village, the provision of wells has mitigated the suffering, though the well-being of the community could deteriorate further. In Battambang, the CASD choice of Battambang district was determined by ease of access and relative security. Krasang village is not a remote or isolated community.

As part of its core programme, CASD has initiated a separate activity to assist vulnerable groups in participating villages. In Popel and Krasang, surveys have identified vulnerable people, though special projects have yet to be implemented. UNICEF project officers anticipate more work in this component during the remaining two and a half years of the programme.

## **2. Participation, Decision-Making and Ownership**

This section analyses issues relating to the control of the development programme in both the original research and in the UNICEF/CASD study. Participation examines whether programmes are adapted to the needs and situations of villagers. Decision-making examines which sorts of people are able to control or influence decisions. Ownership examines the extent to which people at different levels are prepared to take responsibility for the success of activities and to commit resources to them. A particular focus of interest in each study was the role and contribution of the VDC.

*Participatory rural appraisal, participation and decision-making*

The CASD approach to participatory rural appraisal (PRA) is unique because it is tied directly to child assessment exercises. This means that the analysis of community situations and the proposing of solutions emerge from reflections and discussions on the nutritional status of village children under five years old. It also means that mothers with children under five have been placed at the centre of the appraisal process, though the needs assessment is not limited to this group. Another noteworthy aspect of the CASD approach is that assessments and action plans are scheduled to be repeated two or three times per year. Although this has yet to happen in either of the study villages, a regular re-occurrence of the planning exercise helps prevent omissions and inaccuracies in information, and provides opportunities for broader participation. This point was made in the earlier study. By and large, the information gathered in the CASD community assessments, unlike that in some of the programmes examined previously, had a direct influence on activities chosen for implementation in the villages.

In its review of PRAs used in earlier programmes, the original LRDP study argued that care needs to be taken to ensure: that all issues that are important to villagers are included; that villagers are not trying to second-guess organisations' own priorities; that minority interests are not overlooked; and that the initial PRA is followed up by further appraisals. The CASD appraisal process addresses most of these issues well, though the active participation of the poor remains a challenge. A more contentious issue is the second-guessing of CASD priorities. From the point of view of the research team, CASD staff do not sufficiently acknowledge the influence that their priorities have on the requests of the villagers.

*Village development committees, participation and decision-making*

The establishment of VDCs has become an important aspect of CASD's work. CASD has introduced numerous projects and activities into the villages, and the VDCs have become the principal contact point between the government working groups and the villagers themselves. In the two study villages, the VDCs have likewise become the managers of the CASD activities. The VDCs play a pivotal role in the programme, and it is therefore helpful to understand how local authorities and villagers relate to them.

In Popel and Krasang, CASD first held elections for village representatives. This provided an opportunity for those involved in the programme, including the beneficiaries, to assess the merits of the people selected before these people were formally constituted as a VDC. In Popel, one of the two representatives resigned. Unfortunately, the VDC members who were subsequently elected (with the exception of the female village representative, who was elected as chief of the VDC) never acquired a full understanding of the programme. In Krasang, the six elected village representatives were almost immediately constituted as the VDC, and all received extensive training in the aims and objectives of the programme. As CASD rapidly expands into new areas, the strategy of first electing village representatives will undoubtedly give way to more direct organisation of VDCs. Focusing on the development of VDCs permits faster implementation, but it runs the risk of neglecting the poorest. Similar trends and concerns were voiced in the original LRDP study.

In Popel and Krasang, villager participation in the VDC elections was high. In both cases, the candidates who stood for election were chosen by the village chiefs. This allowed the village chiefs to exercise considerable influence over the selection of VDC members.

In Krasang, the village chief's choice of female candidates proved to be ineffectual, for neither of the two women elected have been actively involved in the programme. When questioned about the participation of women in the VDC, the village chief argued that it was difficult to recruit qualified women. The research team found it difficult to accept this, for it encountered women in the village who were knowledgeable about the programme.



In Popel, the two female candidates received the most votes and have been largely responsible for successfully encouraging the participation of women and children in programme activities. During the research team's debriefing session with the VDC in Popel, the presence of the two women VDC members attracted other women to join the gathering. On the basis of its findings, the original LRDP study argued that equal representation of women and men on the VDC would improve the quality of leadership. As a programme focused on the well-being of women and children, CASD is in an excellent position to test this strategy.

The original LRDP study noted that relationships between village chiefs and VDC chiefs were generally positive. Difficulties arose only in a few situations where village chiefs, acting as unelected advisers, tried to dominate VDCs. In none of the villages studied earlier were village chiefs members of the VDCs. Deviating from the pattern most commonly observed in the earlier research, the village chiefs in Popel and Krasang exerted a dominant influence on the VDCs. In Popel, the village chief acted as the deputy VDC chief, and the other VDC members deferred to him as the person with authority in the village. Similarly, the district and commune working groups tended to channel commodities through him. In Krasang, the village chief acted as an advisor to the VDC and played a less active role than did the village chief in Popel. Nevertheless, the village chief made key decisions related to CASD activities. He likewise served as the main contact point for the district and commune working groups, and for staff members of NGOs active in the village.

In Popel and Krasang, VDC members lived in dispersed locations throughout the village. This helped ensure widespread contact with villagers and the rapid dissemination of information. The practice in both villages of VDC members going from house to house to inform residents of meetings and events likewise helped promote participation in activities and provided opportunities for the sharing of health messages. These regular house-to-house visits were rarely encountered in the earlier research. What was similar was that meetings called by the VDCs tended to be for disseminating information rather than for allowing villagers to make decisions. This need not have been the case with CASD had the implementation strategy been followed more rigorously. Village action planning and decision-making were scheduled to take place two or three times a year with each child assessment. But in each of the study villages, child assessments were conducted only once a year.

#### *Ownership and dependency*

A key finding of the original research was that though villagers had a sense of ownership of specific development activities, they did not have a sense of ownership of the development programme as a whole. By comparison, with CASD most villagers had a genuine awareness of the programme, and some VDC members had a real sense of programme ownership. There was not, however, a deep sense of ownership of development and infrastructure activities if this is defined by a willingness to take care of common assets and to take initiatives.

In Popel and Krasang, villagers had a high name recognition of the Khmer acronym for CASD. This was noteworthy because villagers in the earlier research normally just referred to the development agencies in their midst as "the organisation" (*angkar*). In Popel, almost all villagers were familiar with CASD activities, whether they participated in them or not. In Krasang, most villagers were likewise aware of CASD activities, and in general had a greater understanding of the purpose of the programme than did villagers in Popel. Nevertheless, in both Popel and Krasang, villagers themselves, as opposed to some VDC members, had yet to develop a sense of ownership for the development programme. Many villagers participated in the development activities, but few took responsibility for the care of common assets such as wells and credit funds and few, other than VDC members, took initiative for improving the projects. Part of the problem, underscored in the earlier research, was that villagers lacked adequate information which would enable them to take responsibility and ownership.

In some of the previous programmes studied, local contributions were used as a strategy for developing a sense of responsibility and ownership of infrastructure. Generally, this was found to be successful where there were negotiations and agreements with villagers about what their responsibilities were before implementation began. Information sharing rather than control was vital. The original LRDP study argued that if local contributions were enforced without proper dialogue and respect, they could prove to be counterproductive.

Unfortunately, this has largely been the case in Popel, because the village chief who acts as the deputy VDC chief has failed to accurately communicate the principle of local contributions to the villagers. In the case of the treadle wells, the village chief announced that those families or groups of families who could contribute 30,000 riels would receive a well. The local contribution was thus presented as a purchase price rather than as a well-user group subsidy, and was imposed as a condition of acquiring a well. As a result, several treadle wells were built close to one another on the property of those who could pay, leaving other areas of the village where poorer residents lived without any wells at all. Similarly, the village chief's control of information about the rice bank discouraged poorer residents from helping to build the rice store, which then excluded them from membership.

In Krasang, more care was taken to form well-user groups throughout the village and to explain the purpose of local contributions for repairs. But the approval and construction of three hand-pump wells in the village, instead of the nine requested, meant that large numbers of villagers accessed the wells. This made it difficult to delineate well group members and to collect contributions for repairs.

### 3. Sustainability

Sustainability is used within the analysis of the original LRDP research and the UNICEF/CASD study to examine the potential future benefits generated by the development programmes. As part of the broader context, the role of the government, especially in the funding of rural development, is important. This section begins with an examination of the issue of funding, and then focuses on organisational plans for sustaining programmes, before looking at ways of achieving sustained benefits from infrastructure and credit projects.

#### *The funding of rural development*

A important issue raised in the original study, and one that generated much discussion during the National Conference on Rural Development from 17–18 March 1998, was the government funding of rural development. None of the previous programmes studied was funded by government money. In the case of the government support programmes, no provision had been made for the ongoing financing of development activities once capacity building support had stopped. The LRDP study noted that though organisations were building the capacity of government to provide management and technical support to rural development activities in the future, the challenge of funding rural development had not been adequately addressed. This observation is also applicable to CASD.

CASD is a five-year (1996–2000) programme funded by UNICEF and international donors. By the completion of the project, it is expected that government working groups and VDCs will have the capacity to implement the programme on their own. Continued funding by UNICEF and international donors at current levels is unlikely. Meanwhile, the Cambodian government has made no commitment or provision for the funding of CASD activities beyond the life of the project. Much like the government support programmes studied earlier, CASD has to address more critically the issue of rural development financing. This will require UNICEF officials and their government counterparts to raise the visibility of the programme

and to assume a greater advocacy role with national leaders, international donors, and the private sector.

Another issue related to the funding of rural development discussed at the national conference was the capacity of the government at all levels to manage finances properly. Participants expressed concern that money passing through government channels would be lost along the way. UNICEF has thus far minimised the problem of misallocation of funds by providing inputs solely in the form of commodities, and by reserving funding decisions to itself. It has, however, done little to build capacity within government to address the longer-term problem of managing funds. The earlier study emphasised the need for an effective government financial monitoring system from the national to village level.

One further issue related to the funding of rural development raised by the original study was the lack of guarantees that money from international donors would continue to come to Cambodia. This point has particular relevance for CASD. Due to the recent political unrest in Cambodia, international donor support to CASD has been less than what had been expected. For lack of counterpart funding, CASD has operated thus far on only half of the budget approved in its master plan of operations. Donor support for the remaining two and a half years relies on the perception of political openness and stability. The earlier research suggested that in situations where funding cannot be guaranteed by either the national government or international donors, private sector and self-help initiatives must assume greater significance.

#### *Organisational plans for the sustainability of the programme*

In Svay Rieng and Battambang, CASD has mobilised provincial staff from several different government departments plus district and commune officials into reasonably effective working groups. The strategy has been to encourage local government staff to take responsibility for the management of the programme, with a minimum number of UNICEF staff assigned to the provinces. Despite the inherent difficulties involved in coordinating large-scale development programmes, this strategy has worked satisfactorily. This is in large part due to the extensive training provided to provincial, district and commune workers. By relying primarily on local government staff for implementation, the pace and human capacity levels of the programme have evolved in a way that reflects a realistic appreciation of what can be achieved in rural Cambodia. When UNICEF staff withdraw, the effect will be less traumatic on local managers than if UNICEF had established a large provincial presence. Similarly, because local staff do not receive salary supplements from CASD (they are paid instead for specific tasks performed) they will not suffer drastic reduction in income.

In Popel and Krasang, CASD has likewise provided extensive training to village leaders and those involved in project activities. In general, the training of the village leaders in Krasang was more effective than in Popel. This was because the entire VDC in Krasang attended training sessions from the beginning of the programme as village representatives. In Popel, only the VDC chief had attended the initial training as a village representative. In Battambang, the more limited coverage of the programme also allowed for more in-depth training of working groups and villagers than was the case in Svay Rieng. As a result, VDC members in Krasang had taken responsibility for child assessment activities from the working groups, while VDC members in Popel had not. The findings of the original LRDP study—that long-term time commitments by organisations and on-the-job skills transfer by advisers working with trainees help to build organisational and individual capacity—provide only a partial answer for CASD. A full introduction to the aims and purpose of the programme, and limits on coverage to allow more in-depth training, are also important.

*Sustainability of infrastructure*

A general finding of the original LRDP research was that infrastructure in the form of irrigation canals, schools and roads tended to be poorly maintained. By contrast, wells were better cared for. The study concluded that programmes involved in the construction of infrastructure should learn from, and adapt, measures which had been developed in well construction. These included discussion of responsibilities with villagers before implementation; a clear division of responsibilities and leadership roles among groups and sub-groups; the drawing up of separate written contracts prior to construction, detailing responsibilities for maintenance; the collection of funds for maintenance from villagers before signing contracts; training for leaders in repair and maintenance; and the provision of, or access to, tools, spare parts and other materials necessary for repairs.

In contrast to the programmes reviewed previously, no arrangements had been in the CASD study villages for the maintenance of roads or for wells. In Popel, leaders usually took responsibility for repairing at least the combination wells. The treadle wells had only just been installed at the time of the research, but the platforms, built with soil and encased by boards, had already begun to erode. No provision had been made to maintain the treadle wells or even to keep the surrounding area clean. It was expected that the well leaders would somehow maintain and take care of their own wells. In Popel, no provision had been made to maintain the roads built as food-for-work projects in collaboration with WFP. Since payment for work done on the village road had not yet been made, it was not uncommon for households to maintain the road sections assigned to them. While VDC members advised villagers to maintain their road sections, no specific arrangements had been agreed upon.

In Krasang, members of well-user groups agreed, prior to construction, to contribute a fixed and equal amount of money to well leaders for the purpose of repairs. Given that only three wells were eventually approved and built for the use of the entire village, membership in well-user groups was never clearly delineated, and most well users were never asked to contribute the agreed-upon amount for repairs. In one instance where repairs were made, the well leader bore the burden of the cost.

*Sustainability of credit activities*

The original study offered several observations relating to the sustainability of credit activities. The study noted that enabling villagers to understand the details of credit activities and to check the work of committees or managers was difficult. The work of village committees or managers was usually checked by organisational staff rather than by villagers. The lack of accountability to villagers therefore endangered the sustainability of these activities once the organisations withdrew. Although organisations had been generally successful in finding strategies for continuing credit activities, sustaining a high level of benefits had been more problematic. Furthermore, credit schemes were vulnerable to poor crop harvests. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that credit schemes did not have contingency plans for what would happen in the case of crop failure.

In Popel, an emergency rice seed loan activity failed due to drought and was written off. A fertiliser loan scheme succeeded in its first cycle, and paddy rice purchased with the cash repayments from the scheme were incorporated into a newly established rice bank. The VDC members and adviser have made all of the major decisions about the operation of the rice bank, with little consultation with villagers. The oversight of CASD working groups also appeared minimal. Given the history of drought in the village, the prospects of sustaining the rice bank activity looked dim.

In Krasang, a fertiliser loan project was converted into a cash credit scheme, and plans to do the same with a pig loan project were being considered. The future direction of these commodity-turned-cash credit projects had not been thought through by either the CASD staff

or the villagers. A latrine credit project had likewise been started in the village. These three credit schemes were managed by the VDC deputy chief, with little accountability to the activity members. Little supervision was provided by the working groups. The repayment schedules of all three loan schemes coincided with the wet season harvest. Little thought had been given to the consequences of a poor harvest on the villagers' ability to repay their loans.

#### **4. Organisational Structure and Approach**

The original LRDP research and the UNICEF/CASD study have proceeded on the assumption that, despite differences in size and scope, each of the programmes examined has something to learn from the experience of the others. At the local level, all development agencies encounter similar challenges and opportunities.

##### *Engaging the local community*

The findings of the original research highlighted the fact that development organisations deal primarily with village leaders and generally spend little time in villages. Although the practice of working through village leaders was correct, the research team felt that programme staff should allow more time for getting to know villagers and for informally learning about their community. This would provide opportunities to learn more about how projects were being implemented and about how to adapt activities to better suit local circumstances.

In Popel and Krasang, CASD working groups dealt mostly with VDC members and advisers, and tended to gravitate towards the village chiefs. This is not surprising, given that the working groups are composed of government staff who have traditionally operated through hierarchical authority lines. If long-term impact is to be achieved, however, inter-relationships with villagers have to move beyond contact with the leaders. The potential for building capacity through extended presence in a community is an important lesson for CASD.

##### *Relief and development approaches*

Addressing the issue of relief and development approaches, the earlier study noted that the provision of emergency assistance had, in some cases, created attitudes of dependency that undermined responsible participation in development activities. The study pointed out that relief work need not be incompatible with development. Rather than simply meeting immediate needs, relief efforts had to address and reduce vulnerabilities, and recognise and build upon local capacities.

Although CASD was designed as a development programme, it does provide funds for emergency situations. Some projects such as the food-for-work road building and the treadle well construction in Popel contain aspects of both relief and development. By all accounts, CASD activities in Popel and Krasang have not created attitudes of dependency. Residents of both communities, particularly women, work hard to provide for their families, and CASD interventions have not undermined this strong work ethic. However, responsible participation in CASD development activities would be better served if the programme could find ways to tap into the very formidable capacities of poor women in each of these villages.

##### *Local planning processes*

An exciting approach to large-scale development pursued by several organisations studied earlier involved supporting local planning processes within programmes jointly undertaken with the government. Several features of local planning processes held promise for replication. One was the linking of villager participation in the planning process directly to the nego-

tiation and allocation of funds at the commune level. Another was requiring contributions of cash and labour from village beneficiaries. A third was involving government workers in the institutionalisation of decentralised decision-making. The earlier study found that local planning processes worked well when links between project identification and funding decisions were clear.

CASD contributes a great deal to the discussion of local planning processes in Cambodia. One strength of the CASD approach is that it links community planning to the improved nutrition of children under five years old. Another is that it actively encourages the participation of women, especially those with young children. A third is that discussions are scheduled to take place two or three times a year. A fourth is that government staff manage the implementation of planning decisions with little assistance from UNICEF. Within the CASD approach, one striking weakness was evident—the funding of all village action plans was made by UNICEF staff in Phnom Penh. This reduced the role of local committees to that of prioritisation and collation of community problems and solutions. In CASD, the links between project identification and funding decisions were not clear.

#### *Output and process approaches*

A major contrast observed in the earlier study was between approaches that emphasised output—the direct material benefits to be gained from an intervention—with those that emphasised process—the relationships that must be in place for genuine development to take place. There were potential risks in pursuing either strategy too far without regard for the other. A complete reliance on an output-oriented approach runs the risk of undermining sustainability. Without the institutional capacity to manage benefits that have been obtained, there is a real possibility that they will be lost. By contrast, a total preoccupation with process-oriented approaches runs the risk of not generating real economic benefits for impoverished villagers. The earlier study concluded that organisations which aim to reduce poverty must contribute to the improved economic well-being and reduced vulnerability of the villagers with whom they work.

CASD incorporates aspects of both output and process approaches, but it leans decidedly towards process. There are good reasons for this. CASD embodies a rights-based approach which upholds the principle that women and children have a right to participate in development processes and decision-making which affect their lives. CASD likewise aims to assure the survival, protection and development of children in Cambodia. This implies that institutions which support children, such as the family, the village, and the state, must have the capacity to function properly. CASD is right to devote considerable resources to ensuring that these supportive structures are in place. Although CASD does not aim to reduce poverty in Cambodia as such, its stated goal of improving the living conditions of children and women requires it, nonetheless, to address the issue of output. At the mid-point in its five-year cycle, a profusion of activities at the village level has masked serious weaknesses in community participation and capacity building, as well as a relatively small output of material benefits. As work at the community level is intensified, further attention needs to be paid to both process and output issues.

#### *Monitoring and evaluation*

Effective monitoring and evaluation systems were largely absent in the organisations studied earlier. While all the groups acknowledged that learning was an important feature of rural development, the imperatives of implementation largely took over once programmes had begun, and pushed activities forward without much consideration for what had been learned or what needed to be changed. Most organisations were geared to expand before they had learned how

to be effective. In this respect, the organisational structures of even the process-oriented groups were rather inflexible.

CASD has monitored the progress of its work through meetings at provincial and national levels. In mid-June 1998, a national quarterly meeting was called to discuss experiences and lessons learned and to determine whether the programme was on track. It is interesting that many of the discussions revolved around issues of provincial personnel policy and management. Few experiences and lessons from the village level were introduced by the participants. This points to a need for participatory methods of monitoring and evaluation incorporating viewpoints from a broad range of stakeholders, including village beneficiaries. At the same time, the ability of CASD to effectively monitor and evaluate its programme will be adversely affected by its commitment to double its present coverage over the next two years. Serious thought needs to be given to what CASD can realistically accomplish in the final two and a half years of its current cycle. One lesson from the CASD study was that the programme would be better served by an emphasis on consolidation rather than on expansion.

## Conclusion

The conclusion of the original LRDP study noted that many of the approaches examined, particularly those experimenting with local planning processes, held promise for rural development programming on a national scale; an observation likewise true for CASD. At the same time, the previous study observed a noticeable absence of economic impact at the local level. The study argued that a more concerted effort to achieve material outputs at the community level deserved attention. This lesson is also applicable to CASD. The commitment to supply every 20 families in participating villages with one well needs to be reaffirmed and implemented. Similarly, the original study revealed the striking absence of projects aimed at raising productivity, particularly in agriculture. CASD has introduced projects to improve agricultural productivity and practices with limited success.

With respect to credit schemes, the lack of clear and coherent strategies in the earlier programmes studied was all too apparent. A commonly observed response to credit, that left much to be desired, was for organisations to distribute generic loans of relatively small amounts to large numbers of villagers for short periods of time. A more promising approach to credit first identified income generating projects and then made loans sufficient to the requirements of the activities. These observations have immediate and particular relevance for CASD as it moves to establish cash credit activities which support generic loans in small quantities for entire villages.

Among the organisations studied previously, few attempted to develop special projects for the poor. CASD has established a separate activity to identify and assist vulnerable groups, but this has been late in starting and has been inadequately funded.

Despite their bleak assessment of economic impacts at the village level, the authors of the original study were hopeful about the future of rural development in Cambodia. They acknowledged that there were hard lessons to be learned from their investigation, but recognised that they had encountered committed staff and enthusiastic villagers wherever they went. The authors of the UNICEF/CASD study likewise voice the same sentiments.

Finally, the original research, through the documentation of six case studies, underlines the importance of experimentation in rural development programming. Without the benefit of a wide range of varying experiences, it is difficult to develop a body of best development practice. The UNICEF/CASD case study broadens the experience of the original six organisations studied, and makes for a worthy complement to the Learning from Rural Development Programmes in Cambodia project.





## Appendix One<sup>1</sup>

---

# UNICEF/Community Action for Social Development

---

### 1.0 Background

Community Action for Social Development (CASD) is a five-year (1996–2000) community-based development programme initiated by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in cooperation with the Cambodian government to assure the survival, protection and development of children in Cambodia. The programme is composed of six inter-related components: 1) capacity building focused on women and youth; 2) community education and child care; 3) food, water and environment; 4) health, hygiene and caring practices; 5) protection and care of vulnerable children and women; and 6) credit, employment and income. CASD currently operates in eight Cambodian provinces.

The Ministry of Rural Development is responsible for coordinating CASD activities in cooperation with other participating government ministries. Provincial coordinating committees, comprised of staff from the various government departments manage the day-to-day activities of the provincial programmes. CASD maintains close links with other UN organisations and NGOs.

The programme was initiated in the provinces of Svay Rieng, Battambang, and Kompong Thom in 1996; expanded to the provinces of Takeo, Kompong Speu, and Prey Veng in 1997; and then extended to the provinces of Kratie and Strung Treng in 1998. The present study focuses on the implementation of CASD in the Svay Rieng village of Popel and the Battambang village of Krasang.

Popel village is located in Tras commune in Romeas Hek district of Svay Rieng province, two hours travel from the provincial town of Svay Rieng. The majority of Popel’s 131 families cultivate wet season rice on paddy fields and practice slash and burn cultivation in nearby forests. Average yields on paddy rice are 1.5 tons per hectare. A prolonged drought in the village has severely diminished the returns in paddy rice production in recent years. In 1998 there was no harvest at all. Average yields of rice crops on slash and burn farms are 1.32 tons per hectare. Besides rice, villagers grow corn, melon, cassava and sweet potato on the slash and burn plots.

Due to the shortage of rice yields in Popel, the number of villagers engaged in farm labour outside the village has increased. Many farm labourers are women from poorer households. Aside from cultivating crops, households with male labourers earn from cutting timber and firewood in the forest. Some households make charcoal. Many poorer households collect thatch and rattan in the forest which lies about 7 km from the village. Most of this gathering is

---

<sup>1</sup> Appendix One is a summary of the case study for the UNICEF/Community Action for Social Development programme. The full case study (which runs to 40 pages) is available from CDRI.

done by women who transport the thatch and rattan by bicycle to the Vietnamese border about 7 km away. Since the drought, many poorer households, especially those headed by women, do not have enough food to eat every day.

Krasang village is located in Tamuen commune in Battambang district of Battambang province, one hour from the provincial town of Battambang. About half of Krasang's 228 village families own rice land and cultivate their own wet season rice. Some villagers also cultivate floating rice at the Tonle Sap lake. Average yields for wet season rice are 2.0 tons per hectare, and for floating rice 1.5 tons per hectare. Since 1994, drought and flooding have adversely affected rice production. Many households cultivate home gardens and fruit trees on their house lots. Households without rice land earn as farm labourers, pulling seedlings, transplanting and harvesting for others. Aside from working as farm labourers, women from landless households gather vegetables such as morning glory at great distances from the village. Since 1991, Krasang villagers, both women and men, have worked as migrant labourers in Thailand. Usually, they work as agricultural labourers on the Thai border.

### 1.1 Distribution of Benefits

In Popel and Krasang, almost all villagers have benefited from the construction of wells built under CASD. In Popel, four combination ring and hand pump wells were built in 1997 and 1998. These wells provided clean water to large numbers of the village families, particularly those living along the main village road. Nevertheless, by June 1998 three of the four wells had dried up as a result of the prolonged drought. In early 1998, CASD supplied 15 treadle wells to the drought-stricken village. These wells replenished the water supplies lost through the dried up combination wells. Although the 15 treadle wells were not located strategically throughout the village, they did allow children and their parents to drink clean water and to bathe regularly. The treadle wells also were intended to provide water for the irrigation of small plots, but only a few were used for this purpose. In Krasang, three hand pump wells were built under CASD in 1998. The wells have made an important contribution to clean water and improved health in the village. However, the three wells approved for construction in Krasang have been insufficient for the needs of the village families.

In Popel, the rice bank has the potential to benefit less than half of the village households, mainly the medium and better-off. Fifty-six of 131 village families contributed to the building of the rice store and laid claim to the rice stocks purchased primarily with UNICEF funds. These member families had some access to capital to make contributions for materials, some access to the village leadership to gain assurance of the project's integrity, and some access to land to ensure eventual repayment of paddy rice loans. In Krasang, fertiliser, pig and latrine credit activities benefit mostly the medium and better-off with access to land and capital. Poorer households without land holdings or reliable earnings are reluctant to borrow for fear that they will be unable to repay.

Child assessment is the focal point of the CASD programme. By weighing and measuring children under five years old in the village and plotting the data on graphs, those involved in the programme, including the beneficiaries, are able to gauge the nutritional adequacy of the child population in the community and to build a development programme around this. In general, participating mothers in Krasang were better informed about the weight and health status of their children than mothers in Popel. But the comments of mothers in Krasang whose children fell below the health line were similar to those in Popel. They maintained that, given the low earnings in the village, there was little they could do to improve the diets of their children. In both villages, children were undernourished not primarily because of neglect or ignorance but because the return on their parents' labour was low.

In Popel and Krasang, village health education has led to changes in behaviour in hygiene and sanitation. This results from the fact that most of the messages are linked to practical

applications within the capacity of the villagers. In both villages, the distribution of vegetable seeds has encouraged villagers to grow vegetables. In Popel, childminder classes have benefited large numbers of children, while literacy classes have benefited a smaller number of women and men. In Krasang, childminder classes have yet to begin, while literacy classes have benefited single women. In each village, CASD has provided extensive training to village leaders and those involved in project activities. A separate project has identified vulnerable groups in the villages, though activities have still to be developed. For the most part, CASD activities have not encouraged community cooperation.

## **1.2 Participation, Decision-Making and Ownership**

In Popel and Krasang, CASD offers numerous activities for women. VDC members often go from house to house to inform villagers of upcoming events, and women, even from poorer households, have been able to attend child assessment and health education meetings. At the same time, drought in Popel and landlessness in Krasang have meant that women from poorer households are immersed in subsistence activities which limit their participation in programme activities.

Local planning activities in CASD have been able to involve village communities in the identification of problems related to the welfare of mothers and children and to propose solutions to the difficulties experienced. In this sense, the planning process is driven by the community and involves beneficiary participation. Nevertheless, the village plans submitted by the VDC members and the villagers to the commune reflect their knowledge of what is offered by the programme.

In Popel, female members of the VDC have encouraged the participation of women and children in programme activities. In Krasang, female members of the VDC have not been actively involved in the programme. In both villages, village chiefs exert a dominant influence on the VDC. Villagers recognise the name and activities of CASD, but have yet to develop a sense of ownership of the development activities.

## **1.3 Sustainability**

Although the child assessments are a strong and sound feature of the programme, mothers have still to fully understand their importance or to appreciate how they have a bearing on their lives. More projects aimed at increasing the subsistence earnings of poor women need to be started. More practical approaches to improvements in children's diets likewise need to be developed. The formation of support groups for mothers might help to sustain the child assessment activities.

By the end of the year 2000, it is expected that government working groups will have the capacity to implement the programme on their own. Continued funding by UNICEF and international donors at current levels is extremely unlikely. But the Cambodian government has made no commitment to or provision for funding CASD activities beyond the current project cycle. CASD has introduced an innovative approach to rural development programming, but the long term contributions of the programme remain uncertain. CASD has to address more fundamentally and more adequately the issue of rural development funding.

In Popel and Krasang, arrangements have yet to be made for the maintenance of wells and roads. Likewise, provisions for follow-up training in fertiliser use, vegetable growing and pig raising are weak. Although provisions have yet to be made for villager support of childminder classes, a notable achievement has been the arrangement of government support for literacy classes. In both villages, drought threatens many of the CASD activities.

#### 1.4 Organisational Structure and Approach

The aims and objectives of CASD are rooted in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. This emphasis on rights, and on building the capacity of women and children for social development, has important consequences. It centres the entire development programme around the nutritional well-being of the community's youngest and most vulnerable residents. It encourages the participation of women in the identification of community problems and solutions. It offers literacy and childminder classes for the empowerment of marginalised groups. It provides women with real opportunities for practising birth spacing. Although CASD still struggles to be participatory and to respond creatively to the livelihood situations of the poor, its focus of the well-being of children and women equips it with a unique and inclusive approach to the implementation of community development activities.

CASD is envisaged as a programme which supports the decentralisation of rural development. CASD has devolved the identification of community problems and solutions to local groups, but it has not provided funds to commune development committees (with VDC representation) nor required them to make the difficult decisions about how these funds will be allocated. By requiring the approval of all funding requests to be made in Phnom Penh, UNICEF has reserved for itself the real burden of the planning process. Opportunities for decentralised development by local committees have been missed because the control of budgets and the approval of requests have been kept at higher levels.

CASD is a programme of many structures and activities. This imbues the programme with a certain energy and dynamism, but it results in gaps of coordination and implementation. In Popel, the VDC members (with the exception of the VDC chief) never came to a full understanding of the purpose of the programme; food-for-work on the village road remained unpaid despite a serious food shortage; and treadle wells were allocated on the ability of property owners to pay partial subsidies. In Krasang, the three hand pump wells that were built proved inadequate to demand; the childminder class never started because of the lack of materials received; the vulnerable survey raised expectations that went unfulfilled; and the breed of pigs selected for distribution was unsuitable to village conditions. Nevertheless, despite these problems and the fact that rapid expansion threatened effective implementation, CASD was generally on track after the first two and a half years of operation.

*Case Study 7 was prepared by John McAndrew (CDRI associate), Pon Dorina (CDRI), So Sovannarith (CDRI) and Teng You Ky (MRD). The research team studied development activities in the villages of Popel and Krasang (in Tras commune, Romeas Hek district, Svay Rieng province and Tamuen commune, Battambang district, Battambang province respectively) in July 1998.*



Cambodia Development Resource Institute

\$4.50

56 Street 315, Tuol Kork, Phnom Penh, Cambodia  
(Postal address: PO Box 622, Phnom Penh, Cambodia)  
Tel: (855-23) 881-701/881-916/883-603 Tel/Fax: (855-23) 880-734  
e-mail: [cdri@camnet.com.kh](mailto:cdri@camnet.com.kh) website: <http://www.cdri.org.kh>