Working Paper 30:
The Evolution of Demoncratic Process and Conflict Management in Cambodia
A comparative Study of Three Cambodia Election
Caroline Hughes and Kim Sedara
with the assistance of Anne Sovatha
Working Paper 30 in English, 112 pp
Working Paper 30 in Khmer, forthcoming

Executive Summary

This study examines the evolution of mechanisms for conflict management since 1998, and their effectiveness in preventing conflict escalation during the general elections of 2003. The study draws on extensive field research carried out by CDRI researchers on the 1998 and 2003 elections, and on the practical experience of conflict management gained by staff of CDRI’s Centre for Peace and Development which, through its Committee for Conflict Prevention in Cambodian Elections, hosted a four year programme of meetings between election organisers and representatives of political and civil society.

          The present study looked in detail at three specific developments relevant to conflict management that took place between 1998 to 2003, namely the reform of government institutions involved in electoral conflict management, particularly the NEC and the commune level of government; the development of civil society programmes for conflict management; and the changes in electoral procedures, including the overall legal framework for elections, the complaints procedure, and the voter registration procedures. Fieldwork was conducted during the 2003 election period to investigate the impact of these changes on the ability to manage electoral conflict at national and local level. Ability to manage conflict management effectively is regarded in this study as a function of the technical capacity and political legitimacy of institutions, and the level of trust and goodwill between political actors. It is also noted that effective conflict management can itself improve the political legitimacy of institutions and the level of trust between political actors.

          Electoral conflicts were identified at three stages of the research. Before the election, electoral conflicts were identified through initial interviews with political party representatives, through a survey of statements by political actors in public and in COPCEL meetings, and through a survey of issues raised in the press in the six months leading up to the campaign period. During the election campaign period, conflicts were identified through interviews with political actors at national and local level. Following polling day, conflicts were identified through further interviews with political actors, analysis of complaints submitted to the NEC, and through surveys of the justifications put forward by the losing parties for their rejection of the results. Management of conflict was investigated primarily through interviews with parties to conflict and conflict managers, and through survey of any available written materials.

          Overall, the study drew two sets of conclusions. First, it drew conclusions with respect to the impact of the key developments identified on the technical capacity and political legitimacy of institutions charged with conflict management – primarily the NEC, PECs and CECs, and commune authorities. Second, it drew conclusions as to the types of conflicts that are most easily managed by existing mechanisms in Cambodia, as well as identifying problematic elements that lead to conflict escalation.

Institutions for Conflict Management

The study found that institutional reform had been successful with regard to the NEC at the national level, whose working practices gained much greater approval from political actors across the political spectrum in 2003, compared to 1998. In particular, the technical competence and transparency of working practices of the NEC attracted praise. In part this was a function of the changed composition of the NEC, and the changes to the Election Law which dictated the NEC’s functioning in much greater detail. In part, it was a function of civil society efforts to draw the NEC into constructive dialogue with other political actors, and the NEC’s positive response to these initiatives.

          The means of making appointments to the NEC, and to its provincial and commune level subsidiaries continued to attract strong criticism, and led to charges of political bias. These accusations were made particularly loudly in the fraught period of complaints resolution following polling day, and the neutrality of the NEC was in 2003, as in 1998, again raised as an issue in the rejection of election results, despite the relatively positive evaluation of the NEC’s performance before the election. As in 1998, the complaints resolution process proved to be the most problematic part of the NEC’s work. In 2003, continued problems in processing complaints undermined the fragile trust built between the NEC and other political actors in earlier stages of the election process. Changes to the complaints resolution process in 2003 did not significantly alleviate the problem.

          Other conflicts involving the NEC emerged from a lack of fit between the NEC’s legal powers, particularly vis-à-vis other state agencies, and perceptions of its jurisdiction. In its attempt to enforce codes of conducts for local state officials and for the media, for example, the NEC found that it did not have the means to impose penalties for non-compliance. This prompted other political actors to criticise the NEC as weak, toothless, and, in some instances, politically biased.

          Reform of the commune level of government had a significant effect on the ability of political parties to campaign at local level. Multi-party commune councils provided an institutionalised role for the main parties in most communes, legitimising the presence of activists supporting these parties, and providing them with the opportunity to extend their networks and gain experience of working with one another. This removed one of the most serious sources of conflict observed during the 1998 elections.

          However, given the relatively short time since the commune elections, many commune councillors remain inexperienced, and the slow pace of devolvement of resources to commune councils means that these have as yet had little chance to develop their own mechanisms for conflict management. In some communes, SRP and FUNCINPEC councillors reported that they were excluded from influence by their CPP colleagues, and in some communes, village chiefs appeared to report directly to the district level or to their political party, bypassing commune councils, further weakening them as conflict managers.

          Institutional weaknesses, on the part of commune councils and political parties, were the source of inadequate implementation of new procedures for voter registration. Unequal distribution of information was alleged by opposition parties to have benefited CPP supporters at registration and polling, contributing to conflict between parties. The ability of the state to provide similar, non-partisan opportunities for political participation to all voters equally, thus undermining the CPP’s organisational advantage, is still lacking. Less experienced commune councillors, and particularly those from newer parties, need assistance to become local leaders, helping to inform and mobilise villagers even where resources are lacking. Other organisations should also be encouraged to participate in this. The NEC must address the issue of partisanship in information flows to villagers by expanding their own programme.

          During the campaign period, there were fewer complaints about the activities of commune authorities, compared to 1998, suggesting that despite technical deficiencies, the commune authorities had greater legitimacy in 2003. However, many complaints were still made about the behaviour of other local authorities, particularly village chiefs. The NEC’s efforts to control village chiefs met with little success, primarily because the NEC’s role in this respect was not clearly defined in the election law.

Indicators of Likely Success in Conflict Management

In examining the success or failure of these institutions in managing specific conflicts during the 2003 elections, the researchers investigated the following case studies: the conflict over registration; the conflict over village chiefs; the conflict over access to the media; and the conflict over the complaints process. The researchers concluded that of these, only the conflict over access to the media had been resolved satisfactorily. Analysis of these case studies led to identification of the following criteria as indicative of the likely success of conflict management measures as these currently exist in Cambodian elections: 

          Conflict management is successful where:

·        There is agreement on the nature of the conflict;

·        There is agreement on appropriate mechanisms for managing conflict;

·        Managers of conflict have the appropriate powers to implement conflict management processes, even if this means punishing wrongdoers from other institutions;

·        There is agreement on the criteria for measuring success;

·        Mechanisms for managing conflict are efficiently implemented, transparent and accessible.

          Conflict management is unsuccessful where:

·        There is no agreement on the nature of the conflict;

·        There is no agreement on the mechanisms for managing conflict;

·        Managers of conflict are unsure about their powers to implement conflict management processes, if there is likely to be resistance from other institutions;

·        There is no agreement on the criteria for measuring success;

·        Mechanisms for managing conflict are poorly implemented, lacking in transparency and inaccessible.

          These conclusions suggest that conflict management mechanisms in Cambodia continue to suffer from a number of problems:

·        A continued fundamental mismatch of perceptions between representatives of different political parties on current political realities in Cambodia;

·        Lack of forums for frank discussion of these conflicting perceptions;

·        Lack of innovative ideas for conflict management;

·        Distrust between parties sufficient to block frank discussion and experimentation with conflict management;

·        Lack of willingness on the part of political actors to devolve appropriate authority to neutral institutions for conflict management;

·        Lack of technical capacity on the part of institutions and conflict managers;

·        Lack of a culture of transparency and accessibility on the part of state agencies.